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Abstract
Although in recent years the issue of state succession has once again assumed a prominence
in international legal practice, there remains considerable doubt and confusion as to the
content and application of relevant rules and principles. The problem, it is argued, is not so
much the lack of state practice, but a failure to appreciate fully the conceptual problems that
underlie the construction of doctrine. In an attempt to clarify matters, this article reflects
upon two categories of problems that raise continuing difficulties: problems of substance and
methodology, and problems of analytical structure. In each case it is argued that the heart of
the problem lies in the approach taken as regards the creation, assumption or Imposition of
legal obligation In International law, and In the 'construction' of the legal subject It Is the
latter point which is taken up in the final section, where an attempt is made to illustrate why
international law needs to incorporate within its terms a substantive, rather than merely a
formal, conception of the state, and to show how otherwise it Is incapable of explaining legal
continuity in times of radical change.
* Senior Lecturer In Law, Department of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies. Thomhaugh Street,
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European Journal of International Law 9 (1998), 142-162
The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States under International Law 1 4 3
1 Introduction
If there is one common theme running through all recent literature on the law of state
succession. It is that the subject is largely conliised and resistant to simple exposition.1
Rarely is mention made of the topic without reference to the complexity of issues
involved, the almost total doctrinal schism that has polarized thinking, and the lack of
any agreed theoretical structure.2 This may seem surprising given the vast amount of
literature on the subject,3 the fact that the matter has been considered extensively by
the International Law Commission,4 and that two international conventions on the
law of state succession have been adopted.5 Indeed, the overriding impression is that
the more that is written on the subject, the less clear or coherent the whole becomes.
There is a risk, therefore, that even this essay, written with the aim of clarification, will
do little more than muddy the already murky waters. It is thought, however, that a
little reflection upon the nature of the problems that arise may go some way towards
ameliorating their effect
The lack of common agreement on some of the central Issues in the law of state
succession has become particularly evident in the wake of the territorial/political
changes in Central and Eastern Europe,6 particularly following the 'dissolution' of the
Jennings remarks, for example, that the law of state succession 'Is a subject which presents such a rich
diversity of practice as to give some plausibility to a surprisingly varied range of theoretical analysis and
doctrine'. Jennings, 'General Course on Principles of International Law', 121 RdC (1967), at 437.
The ILC commented, for example, that '[a] close examination of State practice afforded no convincing
evidence of any general doctrine by reference to which the various problems of succession in respect of
treaties could find their appropriate solution'. Yearbook ILC (19 74 — H. part I), at 168. para. 51. Cestren
remarks similarly that The elucidation of this question Is rendered difficult by the absence of general
International treaties and In view of the great instability in the practice observed by different States In
different periods. It is. therefore, not surprising to find that differences of opinion, even with regard to
certain fundamental aspects of the problem, prevail in the doctrine of the law of nations.' See Castren.
'Obligations of States Arising from the Dismemberment of Another State1, 13 Za6RV (1951) 753.
Some of the most prominent works are D. O'Connell. State Succession In Municipal and International Law.
vols. I and n (1968); E. Fellchenfeld. Public Debts and State Succession (1931); A. Keith, The Theory of State
Succession with Special Referenceto English and Colonial Law (1907):O.Udokang, Succession of New States to
International Treaties (19 77); A. CavagUeri, La dottrinadeUasuccesslonedi stato a statoe 11 suovaloregluridico
(1910); Hershey. The Succession of States'. 5 AJIL (1911) 285; Jenks. 'State Succession in Respect of
Law Making Treaties'. 29 BVML (1952) 105.
The problem of state succession was placed on the ILCs agenda at Its first session In 1949. following the
recommendation of Lauterpacht in his survey (UN Doc A/CN.4/1/Rev.l. 10 Feb. 1949). 1 Yearbook ILC
(1949) 53, UN Doc A/CN.4/Ser.A/1949.
Vienna Convention on State Succession hi Respect of Treaties. 17ILM (19 78) 1488: Vienna Convention
on State Succession In Respect of Property. Archives and Debts, 1983. 22 ILM (1983) 306.
See generally, Shaw. 'State Succession Revisited'. 6 Ftnn.Y.LL (1995) 34; Schachter, 'State Succession:
The Once and Future Law', 33 Vo. /. lnt'l L. (1993) 253: Martins, 'An Alternative Approach to the
Intematkmal LawofState Succession'. 44 Syr.LK (1993) 1019; Lloyd, 'Succession. Secession, and State
Membership In the United Nations'. 26 N.Y.V.J.LLP. (1994) 761: Scharf, 'Musical Chats: The
Dissolution of States and Membership m the United Nations'. 28 Cornell lnt'l LJ. (1995) 29; Williams.
•State Succession and the International Financial Institutions: Political Criteria v. Protection of
Outstanding Financial Obligations'. 43 ICLQ (1994) 776.
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USSR,7 Yugoslavia,8 and Czechoslovakia,9 and the unification of Germany.10 It
remains unclear, for example, whether and to what extent the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) remains bound by the treaties of the former
Yugoslavia.11 If it is not accepted as the 'continuation' of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (as indeed is implied by its exclusion from participation in the
UN12), can it still be considered to be a party to the Genocide Convention and thereby
found the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the present case?13 If it is a party to the Convention,
as the Court seems to have assumed, there is a need for further consideration as to why
that is the case (especially as it has not issued a notification of succession). The
position is all the more confused since some element of continuity appears to be
accepted in the practice of treaty depositaries, while actively opposed by certain
states.14
The case of German unification was less overtly problematic as far as state
succession was concerned, but nonetheless raised a number of fundamental
See, e.g., Koskennleml and Lehto, 'La succession d'Etats dans 1'ei-URSS, en ce qul concern
parttculierement les relations avec la Finland*' 38 AFDI (1992) 179; Love. 'International Agreement
Obligations after the Soviet Union's Break-up: Current United States Practice and Its Consistency with
International Law'. 13 VanJ.T.L. (1993) 413: MUllerson, 'New Developments In the Former USSR and
Yugoslavia', 33 Va. ]. Int'l h. (1993) 299; Williams, The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the
Former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Chechoslovakia: Do They Continue In Force?'. 23 Dem. J.LLP.
(1994) 1; Bunn and Rhinelander, The Arms Control Obligations of the Former Soviet Union'. 33 Va. /.
Int'l L (1993) 323: Beato. 'Newly Independent and Separating States' Succession to Treatier
Considerations on the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet Union'. 9 Am.U./.LLP.
(1994) 525.
See, e.g.. Mullerson. supra note 7; Williams, supra note 7; Beato. supra note 7.
See. e.g.. Malenovsky, 'Problemes Jurtdiques Lies a la Partition de la Tchecoslovaqule', 39 AFDI (1993)
305: Williams, supra note 7.
See. eg., Randehhofer, 'German Unification: Constitutional and International Implications', 13 Mich. J.
inflL. (1991) 122; Oeter, 'German Unification and State Succession'. 5 Za<5RV(1991) 349. at 352-353;
Tomuschat, 'A United Germany within the European Community'. CMLR (1990) 415; Jacque.
'LTJnincation de l'Allemagne et la Communaute Europeenne", 94 RGDIP (1990) 997.
The •Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties' of 1996
described the FRY as tht 'predecessor state' whose treaty obligations remained unaffected by the
secession of the various Yugoslav republics. UN Doc. ST/LEG/8. paras. 297-298 (1996). The US.
Germany and Guinea all objected to these paragraphs (UN Docs. S/1996/251; S/1996/263;
S/1996/260) and an erratum was Issued.
See SC Res. 777 (1992); GA Res. 47/1 (1992); Opinion of UN Legal Counsel UN Doc. A/47/485 (1992).
See generally, Wood, 'Participation of Former Yugoslav States in the United Nations and In Multilateral
Treaties', 1 Yearbook UN Law (1997).
Case Concerning (he Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia). ICJ Reports (1996) 3, at para. 17. The ICJ considered the FRY to be a
party to the Genocide Convention by reason of the fact that It had expressed Its intention to remain bound
by the treaty In a declaration of 27 April 1992. What the Court conveniently overlooked, however, was
that the rrsmrr of the declaration was the FRY'S claim to be the continuation of the former Yugoslavia.
See dissenting opinion of Judge Kreca, supra note 13, para. 93. Also, Wood, supra, note 12.
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questions. For example, a central assumption seems to have been that unification did
not involve the creation of an entirely new state.15 If otherwise, it might have been
concluded that both the FRG and GDR had ceased to exist and that the new Germany
would have to apply afresh for membership in international organizations (including
the UN and EC). But if the process was essentially one of the absorption of the GDR by
the FRG16 (a matter which presumably cannot be determined solely by reference to the
parties themselves), questions arise as to the status of the agreements of the former
GDR. Was it the case that they were nullified by the process of union, or did they
continue to apply on a territorial basis (as is laid down in Article 31 of the 1968
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties17)?
The answers to such questions, and numerous other similar ones, cannot be found
in any simplistic process of doctrinal inquiry. Ultimately, in any case of state
succession (which, for want of a better description, may be defined as a 'change in
sovereignty over territory'18) two sets of problems of an interrelated nature arise. First,
and most visibly, are problems of substance — defining the existence, content, and
scope of particular prescriptions. An example of such a problem arose recently in the
Genocide Convention case where the International Court of Justice was faced with the
question whether or not there existed a rule of automatic succession to conventions of
a humanitarian nature (and therefore to the Genocide Convention itself).19 Although
the ICJ left the matter open, Shahabuddeen, In his separate opinion, appeared to
favour such a view, relying, inter alia, upon a particular construction of the objec L and
purpose of the Convention.20 Another similar example might be drawn from the
Some traditional schools of thought maintained that when two or more states unite, the personality of
each becomes extinct See, e.g., P. Flore. International Law Codified and Its Legal Sanction (5th ed.. 1918), at
133.
Article 1(1) of the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990. 30 1LM (1991) 457, makes clear that the
unification takes the form of accession under Article 23 of the FRG Basic Law of 1949. Article 23
envisaged the application of the Basic Law to other German territory following an act of accession (this is
to be contrasted with Article 146 which envisaged the unification of the two states to form a new state
with a new constitution). On 23 August 1990 UK Voliakammer decided by a two-thirds majority in
favour of the accession of the GDR to the FRG based on Article 23 of the Basic Law.
Article 31(1) provides that '[wjhen two or more States unite and so form one successor State, any treaty
in force at the date of the succession of States In respect of any of them continues In force In respect of the
successor State ...'
Definitions Include a "transfer of territory from one national community to another', O'ConneU. supra
note 3, vol. I, at 3: the 'replacement of one State by another In the responsibility for international
relations of territory', Vienna Convention. 1978, Article 2(l)(a); the 'transfer of territory of one State to
another', Feilchenfek), supra note 3; 'la substitution d"un su(et a l'aatre dans un rapport juridtque donne
qui demeure ldenttque'. Udlna, 'La Succession des Flats Quant aux Obligations International autre que
les dettes PuWlques'. 44 RdC (1933). at 665.
See, eg.. Kammmga. 'State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties'. 7 EJU. (1996) 469;
MOllerton. The Continuity and Succession of States by Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia',
42 /00(1993)473 .
Shahabuddeen suggested that 'to effectuate Its ob)ect and purpose, the Convention would fall to be
construed as Implying the eiuieatonof a unilateral undertaking by each party to the Convention to treat
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recent Gabcicovo-Nagymaros case in which a central point of dispute was whether
the agreement to construct a series of dams along the Danube was essentially in the
nature of a treaty establishing a 'territorial regime' and therefore subject to automatic
succession.21 The response of the Court to that question was In the affirmative — not
only did It find Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention to be declaratory of
customary international law, it concluded that the agreement In question was indeed
territorial in nature despite the fact that it had never been executed and had been
substantially repudiated by both parties.22 Whatever the position taken. It Is clear that
these problems essentially involved assessing whether or not there was sufficient
evidence to support the establishment of the norm of automatic succession in
question, and whether its application could be justified in the case at hand. They were,
in other words, concerned primarily with the existence and scope of particular rules of
general international law.
The second set of problems essentially concern classification or taxonomy:
determining what schemata of principles is to be employed. Such questions are
inevitably closely related to the first set of problems, insofar as the development of a
particular rule will always depend to some extent upon how practice is classified, and
what practice is considered analogous in the circumstances. Questions of taxonomy
are distinct, however, in that they operate on a different level of generality. Here the
concern is not so much as to the content of individual norms, but the circumstances in
which sets of interrelated norms should operate. In the context of Yugoslavia, for
example, the issue of 'continuity' was a problem of classification or taxonomy Insofar
as it was of importance, not only for membership in international organizations,23 but
also as regards entitlement to assets and responsibility for debts, treaty obligations and
delicts. Such problems are more in the nature of 'structural' problems, the relevance of
which Is explicitly dependent upon particular theoretical assumptions: that we speak
at all of 'annexation', 'cession', 'dismemberment', 'secession', or the like, is not
because such categories are set in stone, nor indeed because they are terms of art, but
because we accept them as useful and necessary descriptive categories. That they are
either useful or necessary, however, is a reflection of the particular theory of
succession adopted. For example. If the central consideration is one of 'mutual
consent', the classification would reflect a fundamental division between cases of
'cession' and 'union' on the one hand, and cases of conquest and secession on the
successor States as continuing as from Independence any status which the predecessor State had as a
party to the Convention. The necessary consensual bond Is completed when the successor State decides to
avail Itself of the undertaking by regarding ttsdf as a party to the treaty.'
See Case Concerning the Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September
1997.
Ibid, para. 123.
See, eg.. Hum. 'UN Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?'. 86 AJIL (1992) 830.
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other.24 By contrast. If the central consideration is rather the Issue of personality (as it
is in most traditional works) the classification would distinguish categorically
between instances of secession and of dismemberment The point is that unless some
agreement is reached as to the basis of the taxonomy employed, doctrine will always
be at a loss to explain why a principle utilized in one circumstance should be applied in
another. Before considering such issues in greater detail, it is as well to consider briefly
the more immediate issues of substance and methodology.
2 Problems of Substance and Methodology
For many authors, the central issue of substance is simply whether or not one of two
alternative theses should be applied: the 'universal succession' thesis or the 'clean
slate' (tabula rasa) thesis.25 The former approach is a derivative of the Roman law
concept of inheritance in civil law, in which the heres (the appointed successors)
acquire not merely a single res, but an aggregate of rights and liabilities called a iuris
universitas.2f> Prichard explains that at the time of Justinian:
The universal successor ngqimwi the whole of the legal dothlng of the person to whom he
succeeds; steps, as It were. Into his shoes. He takes over his rights and liabilities of every kind;
his property {res singular) and iura in re allena, the debts and other obligations (such as rights
of action for damages for breach of contract) owing to him, and the debts and obligations
which he owes.27
It was in the work of Gentili,28 GrouW and Pufendorf30 that such concepts found
their way, in rudimentary form, into the body of international law, it being argued
that the rights and duties of the predecessor passed ipso jure to a successor sovereign.
Although such authors were generally concerned primarily with succession of the
person of the sovereign (I.e. what is now referred to as succession of governments),31
rather than succession of 'states', the universal succession thesis survived largely
For this view see Keith, supra note 3, at 1.
See, e.g., Schaffer, •Succession to Treaties: South African Practice In light of Current Developments m
International Law1, 30 1CLQ (1981) 593.
This Is what distinguished the heir (the universal successor) from the legatee. H. Joiowlcx, Historical
Introduction to the Study of Roman law (1954). at 127.
A. Prichard, Leage's Roman Private Law (3rd ed., 19 61). at 2 3 3. Jokrwicx points out that liability for delict
was sometimei IWITM-H 'personal' such that it became extinguished altogether. See Jolowicx. supra note
26, at 128.
Dejure Belli Ubri Tra (1612, translated by Rolfe. 1964) m, at ndi.
Vt Jure BeOi ac Pads, H, tx. 10-12 . xiv. 1, 10. See generally. O'Connefl. supra note 3, voL I, at 9-10:
PrttrhrntiM, supra note 3, see esp. ch. D.
Dejure Naturae et Gentium Ubri Odo (1688, translated by CHdfather and OkUather, 1934) VEX at xll, ss.
1-9.
See O'Connefl. supra note 3, voL I. at 1-2 (who arguably overstates the point).
148 EfIL 9 (1998), 142-162
intact until the late nineteenth century." By this stage it found its justification not so
much in thelstic dogma but in theories of 'popular continuity',3' 'organic substi-
tution"4 and, improbably enough, 'autolimitation'.35
The 'clean slate' thesis, by contrast, appears to have emerged in the late nineteenth
century as a result of the influence of voluntarist or imperative approaches to law (the
WUlenstheorie).*6 It proceeds from an understanding of law as deriving from the
expression of sovereign will, and embodies thereby the view that legal relations are
essentially personal. As a result, the process of transformation necessarily involves a
legal hiatus when the sovereignty of one state comes to an end and another takes its
place. In such a situation, there can be no 'transfer' of rights or obligations between
the old and the new state. Rather, the Incoming sovereign is free of all rights and
obligations save those it assumes afresh.
In reality, neither of these two positions is wholly tenable, nor do they provide ready
solutions to the range of problems that arise in the context of state succession. It Is
clear to begin with that neither rule makes much sense with respect to cases of cession
of territory. In such cases the 'successor' (if that is how the cessee is to be addressed)
will neither begin life with a clean slate, nor will it succeed to the full range of rights
and duties of the 'predecessor'. It is, therefore, only when a new state comes into
existence, or when an old state ceases to exist that the debate is of significance. Even
then, the two approaches tend to be insufficiently nuanced: to claim for instance, in
the context of dismemberment, that a rule of universal succession applies does little to
address problems such as the distribution of property or debts among successor states.
Even when considered within the restricted context of treaties, the universal
succession thesis demands too much. It argues for the maintenance of legal continuity
in circumstances in which some alteration of legal relations is both inevitable and
necessary. It assumes that states may be burdened with obligations in a situation
where specific consent is palpably absent, not because of any universal necessity but
because of some inchoate systemic interest in legal continuity. The clean slate thesis,
See generally, O'Connell. 'State Succession and the Theory of the State1. Grot Soc. P. (1972) 23.
E.g., Flore, supra note 15, at 134. This theory maintains that the state has two forms of personality: the
political and the social. In cases of state succession, only the political personality of the state (a fictitious
concept) Is affected, leaving the social personality (the legal condition of the people) Intact. See,
O'ConneU. supra note 3, voL L at 11.
See, eg., M. Huber, Die StaaUnsuaxsskm (1898), at 18-19: J. Westlake, International Law (1904). at 61:
Idem, The Nature and Extent of the TWe by Conquest'. 17LQR(1901) 392. According to this theory the
successor state (conceived as an organic Juridical entity) merely absorbs the factual situation brought
about by the predecessor's legal commitments. In doing so, It takes over all the rights and duties of its
predecessor, save those which are essentially political. See generally, O'ConnelL supra note 32, at 40-45.
See, eg., G. Jelllnek. ABcgemdn Staatslehre (1900), at 367-375. Despite employing the consensually-
ortented' Wtiknsthcorit', Jdllnek found that states were bound, practically speaking, to accept tacitly the
continuity of legal obligation. This, however, can dearly be regarded as a matter of 'novation', rather
than 'succession'.
See, eg.. CavaglierL supra note 3: CavagUerL 'Regies Generales du Drolt de la Parx'. 26 RdC (1929) 311,
at 364-376.
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by contrast is not properly a thesis of succession at all.37 It denies the possibility of the
passing of rights and duties in virtue of an overarching requirement of consent But in
denying the possibility of succession, it also appears to deny the possibility of law. Only
by resort to some artificial notion of auto-limitation38 can a strict application of a
voluntarist approach be reconciled with the existence of external legal obligation
(bearing in mind that a looser notion of collective consent is apparently excluded).
It is also very clear that on an evidential level, state practice does little to
substantiate e|fher position. In very few cases have newly emergent states discarded,
in their entirety, all rights and duties that were formerly incumbent upon the previous
sovereign. Even those states emerging from a process of decolonization tended to
accept a certain number of treaties entered into on their behalf by former colonial
powers." This i.c especially the case with respect to treaties establishing a territorial
regime.40 On the other hand, it is equally rare to find examples where no alteration in
the legal position of a state or territory has occurred following a change in
sovereignty.41 It is generally accepted, for example, that certain 'personal treaties',
such as treaties of friendship or alliance (and perhaps commercial treaties), are not
subject to automatic succession.'" Similarly, it is widely conceded that there is limited
Bello argues that the 'clean slate theory' Is a 'misnomer'. 'Reflections on Succession of States In the Light
of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States In Respect of Treaties 1978'. 23 GYIL (1978) 296. at
309-310.
Cf. Jefllnek's concept of 'SelbstverpflkhUingdchre', Idem, Die Rcchtlkhe Natur der Staatenvertrtge (1880). at
l i t
It Is clear that very few states have. In practice, refused to apply any of the predecessor states' treaties (the
one mnln exception bdng Israel). See International Law Association, ITif Effect of Independence on Treaties
(1965). at 2-3; O'Connell. 'Independence and Succession to Treaties', 38 BYbIL (1962) 84; Keith.
•Succession to Bilateral Treaties by Seceding States', 61 A]H (1967) 521. O'Connell argues that the
evidence cited by the ILC to support its 'dean slate' thesis Is extremely partial. He suggests that 1) it
arbitrarily excluded from analysis cases of separation (such as the separation of Norway from Sweden) In
which the clean slate analysis was not applied; 11) many examples given were from the nineteenth
century (such as the Independence of Latin American republics) when there was only a restricted
category of treaties, many of which were merely treaties of political alliance: HI) In practice, through the
use of devolution agreements, a good many treaties remained In force for the successor states. O'ConndL
•Reflections on the State Succession Convention'. 39 ZaSRV (1979) 725, at 729-733.
The special nature of such 'territorial' treaties wa« first recogntied by de Vattel. who distinguished
between 'real' treaties and 'personal' treaties. The former he considered to be 'those contracts by which a
right Is once for all acquired. Independently of any subsequent acts of either party'. E. de Vattel, The Low of
Nations, vol. II (Trans. Chltty. 1863), c. xiL 204. These have become known as 'dispositive treaties' or
'international servitudes' and are thought to create rights In land and to survive changes in sovereignty.
O'Connell, supra note 3, vol. n. at 12-2 3; A. McNalr. The Low of Treaties (19 61), at 2 56. Such treaties may
be universal or particular, and Include treaties of cession, boundary treaties, peace treaties, treaties of
neutrality and treaties providing for rights of way over territory. The notion of dispositive treaties is given
specific recognition m the Vienna Convention 1978, Articles 11 and 12. Cf. also. Case Concerning the
Gabdkovo-Nagyrnaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia). Judgment of 25 September 1997, para. 123.
This might be possible In the case that the least 'disruptive' form of succession occurs, namely, cession of
territory. In cases in which succession Involves the emergence of a wholly new state, it is unlikely that
purely political treaties or delicts of the predecessor state will continue.
See, eg., R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.). Oppenhelms International Law (9th ed.. 1992). at 212.
150 EJJL 9 (1998), 142-162
succession to delicts (unliquidated debts).4' The argument, therefore (if indeed there is
one at all), is only as to which approach is more accurate in a very general sense —
one which supports a notion of succession or one which emphasizes, instead, the
necessity of consent?
The approach adopted for the debate above is likely to be informed primarily by the
broad approach taken as to the nature of international law. One of the central
difficulties underlying the notion of succession has been the perceived absence in
international law of a set of systemic norms that governs all dimensions of the
creation, disappearance or mutation of the legal order of the state.44 This is
represented, in a weak sense, by the perception that international law is not as yet
sufficiently developed to guarantee the transmission of rights and obligations in case
of changes in the condition of states.45 In a stronger sense, however, it manifests Itself
in a recognition that the essentially consensual nature of international law, and the
bilateral nature of international legal obligation, pose almost insuperable obstacles in
the way of the development of a law of succession. From one perspective, to consider a
successor state to be party to a treaty ratified by the predecessor state is to assume that
those obligations could be imposed on what is, to all intents and purposes, a third
party, without its consent. If the successor state is, in reality, a legally distinct person,
the treaties of the predecessor state must be considered essentially res inter alios acta.*6
Nor is the issue merely one of the rights and duties of the successor state: if some
element of succession is accepted, the successor will necessarily assume certain rights
and duties vis-d-vis other states. Preservation of legal continuity in such circum-
stances can only be Justified by one of two arguments (assuming the absence of an act
of novation). Either continuity is ensured systemically in virtue of a positive rule of
succession, to which all states (new and old) are assumed to have consented, or it is
ensured through the continuing identity of the subject (as perhaps might be expressed
in some notion of'popular continuity') which in essence denies the fact of succession.
Considering the first possibility, there are essentially three problems that attend to
the development of a customary law of state succession. The first is that state practice
will rarely provide a substantive explanation for the fact of legal continuity. The
assumption of rights and duties on the part of a successor state may variably be
interpreted either as an explicit recognition of the operation of a norm of succession or
as an assumption it novo of certain international rights and duties (through an act of
novation). In both cases, evidence of consent may be provided, but in the absence of an
express statement as to its import it cannot necessarily be construed as a recognition
See, eg., Robert E. Brown case, AX)., voL 2, no. 35.
This approach has traditionally been expressed In the form of the 'state as fact' argument See, e.g.,
Cavagltert supra note 36, at 321. 340-341.
Such a view Is Implicit In the contention that international law. as a 'primitive' system of law. does not
possess a dear set of secondary rules which include. Inter alia, rules of change. See generally, HX^A. Hart
71K Concept of Law (1961), at 209.
Castren. atpra note 2, at 754.
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of succession in law.47 Even in the context of treaties, where depositaries will usually
register the fact of succession, accession or the like, there is frequently doubt as to
whether succession was considered to occur automatically or by reason of the fact of
notification.
Secondly, unlike many other areas of law, the law of state succession benefits little
from codification.48 hi its conventional form, the law of state succession is ultimately
self-regarding — the question whether a new state is bound by particular
conventional norms of succession is contingent upon a recognition that it has. indeed,
succeeded to those norms. This point was not lost on the ILC which, when drafting
articles on state succession to treaties, admitted that the adoption and general
ratification of a relevant treaty would itself do little to resolve legal difficulties:
Since a succession of States In most cases brings Into being a new State, a convention on the
law of succession In respect of treaties would ex hypothesi not be binding on the successor
State unless and until it took steps to become a party to that convention; and even then the
convention would not be binding upon it in respect of any act or fact which took place before
the date on which it became a party. Nor would other States be bound by the convention in
relation to the new State until the latter had become a party.4'
The particular aim of the ILC, therefore, was not so much to achieve results by
conventional means, but rather to begin a process of codification and clarification in
the hope that the norms may eventually take on the character and shape of norms of
customary international law.50 Such a transformation, however, is far from simple.
Certainly, as the ICJ noted, a 'widespread and representative participation in the
convention might suffice' but only 'provided it included that of States whose interests
were specifically affected'.51 The problem here is that, even assuming widespread
ratification of the Vienna Conventions, in most cases those states specifically affected
will, ex hypothesi, not have ratified the Convention nor will there necessarily be any
evidence of 'extensive' and 'uniform' practice.
This leads to the third point, namely, that it is assumed that newly emergent states
would be automatically bound by the terms of a general international law of
succession. The traditional justification for this lies in the supposition that, in seeking
entry into the international legal community, new states impliedly accept the terms of
existing general international law.52 Leaving aside the question-begging nature of
such resort to 'tacit' consent (it clearly not being the same as consent to the creation of
a legal norm), it may be argued that there is a world of difference between the
47
 O'ConnelL accepting that practice was by no means coherent, remarked that an appreciation of the law
of state succession was 'ultimately one of emphasis'. O'ConnelL supra note 3, vol. I, at 33.
** O'fVinn^TI TTffmnrtm tfinf *Stft*f P"f^^ff^OT1 \fi fl ffl*h)fy* altPflfthfT npST^pd tO thp pTOCfSMy of CpHlflrnrtnn,
let alone of progressive development.1 O'ConnelL 'Reflections', supra, note 39, at 726.
•" 1974. IL p t L at 170. para. 62. This point Is further bolstered by the principle of non-retroacovity
embodied in Arttde 7.
50
 Yearbook ILC (1981 — H. part il), at 9. See Bdto. supra note 37, at 301-302 .
" North Sea GmUnertalSheycaseMq Reports (1969), at 3. para. 73.
u
 See, eg . , Westiake. International law. supra note 34. at 49; HaH International Law (4th ed. 1895), at 44: L.
Oppenhehn. International Law: A Treatise (2nd ed.. 1910), at 18.
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acceptance of obligations where there is evidence of an existing general practice and,
on the other hand, the acceptance of rules whose application is directed specifically
and exclusively to new states as they emerge onto the international plane. The point is
that new states do not enter into a legal community in which the rules of succession
govern the relations between states on a day-to-day basis, but are rather subjected to
the application of a particular, conditional set of rules that lay down the legal
circumstances that are to accompany their 'birth'. This is not to say that the creation
of rules of this type is an impossibility, but rather that their justification cannot be
based upon the traditional processes of tacit consent, acquiescence or estoppel.
3 Problems of Analytical Structure
Whilst methodological issues are certainly of importance in the context of state
succession, it is in the lack of structural clarity and the mutability of classification that
most problems arise. As O'Connell remarked, '[i]t is significant that, in the history of
State succession, controversy has developed not so much around the question
whether such and such a principle exists as over application of such a principle'.5'
Although this is not a problem specific to the question of succession, particularly
insofar as all customary international law is dependent upon operative taxonomy, it is
nevertheless particularly evident in this area.
In traditional works, a distinction is usually made between forms of succession
determined by reference to the nature of the change taking place and its effect on the
personality of the predecessor state. It is common, for example, to find a differentiation
between universal succession and partial succession.54 In the former case, the
predecessor state Is said to cease to exist and there is thus greater pressure to ensure
succession to international rights and duties. In the latter case, succession will be less
maximal Insofar as the predecessor state remains prima facie responsible for ^J
international rights and duties. Thus the law of state succession has, for some time,
been explicitly contingent upon the 'personality' of the state, and specifically its
'identity' or 'continuity', which remained the point of differentiation between the
operation of two distinct legal regimes. Identity, therefore, serves to differentiate
between a case of cession (or secession)55 and one of dismemberment,"1 between a case
of absorption (or annexation) and one of union,57 and between the birth of a new state
and Its resurrection.58 In each case, the defining consideration is whether or not the
state concerned retains its legal identity; in other words, whether it continues its
" O'Connell, supra note 3, voL I, at 29.
54
 See, e.g.. Ftore. supra note 15; Udokang, supra note 3; Jennings and Watts, supra note 42, at 209.
" Sec Yearbook ILC (1974 —U), at 263-266.
** E.g. Austria-Hungary In 1918, see K. Marek. Identity and Continuity of Stales In Public International Law
(1954), at 205-210; Federation of Mali, see Cohen, 'Legal Problems Arising from the Dissolution of the
Mall Federation', 36 BYT>IL(1960) 375.
57
 Eg. Yugoslavia 1918. see. Marek. supra note 56. at 237-262. UAR (1958). Cotran. •Some Legal Aspects
of the Formation of the United Arab Republic and the United Arab States', 8 ICLQ(1959) 346.
" Kum. 'Identity of States under International Law'. 49 AJIL (1955) 68.
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personality as a state. Such differentiations are thought to be particularly important
because international law presumes that all decisions relating to the continuation or
otherwise of a state's rights and duties, assets and liabilities, will be dependent upon
the universal characterization adopted. This, in turn, flows from the proposition that
the possession of international rights and duties inheres in an entity with appropriate
legal personality. Identity, therefore, provides the key to determining the proper set of
norms that are to be applied in a given case.
In practice, however, it has become very clear that such distinctions raise more
questions than they answer. In most cases, it is extremely difficult to distinguish
properly between the two classes of case, as. for instance, between a case of multiple
succession and one of dismemberment, or between a case of absorption and one of
union. This was certainly the case in the past (as with the dissolution of the Dual
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary in 1919, and the unification of the Kingdoms of Italy)
and continues to be a live issue today (as with the argument over continuity of the
USSR and Yugoslavia, and the absorption/union of Germany). The difficulty is that
factually speaking, the processes are similar: in the case of Yugoslavia, the process
could equally well be viewed as one of multiple secession or as one of dismemberment
Both situations involve the non-consensual disengagement of a number of territorial
units from the former parent state. Without a clear point of differentiation, problems
will inevitably arise as to the proper characterization of particular cases and the
determination of what analogies are appropriate in the circumstances.
4 O'Connell and the Elimination of Personality
Such problems of differentiation were clearly perceived by O'Connell, who sought to
eliminate in large part any consideration of the issue of 'personality' from the law of
state succession. His central thesis was that legal doctrine on succession had been
derailed by the predominance of Hegelian conceptions of the state, which, from the
time of Bluntschli onwards, understood the question of succession in terms of the
identity (or personality) of the parties themselves. He argues that when Hall made
personality the universal touchstone of succession, jurists came to think that treaties
were generally annulled by change of sovereignty. Such an approach, he thought
stood in distinction from the earlier, and better, approach, namely to analyse the effect
of change upon the treaty concerned, rather than the continuity or otherwise of the
parties.59 He comments that '[t]he law of State succession in the mid-twentieth
century has reached a position of crisis, because evident moral and sociological
pressures emphasise the need for continuity and the avoidance of disruption, while
theory remains enmeshed In the nineteenth-century conception of sovereign will'.60
The point was that, although 'a conceptual distinction must be made between
succession of States and continuity of States', the problems of succession differ from
those of continuity 'only to the extent that the legal regime governing the
" O'Connell. supra note 39. at 734.
*° O'ConneU. supra note 3. voL L at 34.
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consequences of a change of sovereignty differs from that governing the consequences
of a change of government'.61 He took the view that since the boundary between
change of sovereignty and change of government 'wears thin to the point of
disappearance','2 the question may be asked whether 'there is any utility in
maintaining a rigid distinction between the legal consequences of the one and the
other situation'.65 He therefore advocated, and indeed foresaw, a return to (what he
considered to be) the eighteenth-century position in which all changes to the
condition of the state would fall somewhere along a continuum in terms of their effect
on a state's international rights and obligations. The presumption, however, would be
one of continuity of rights and obligations which 'only concrete analysis may rebut':
If there is any rubric, therefore, to which one could resort as a touchstone for the solution of
all problems of political change over territory it might be this: that the consequences of such
change should be measured according to the degree of political, economic and social
disruption which occurs."
The point being made was that merely because a case may be classified as one of
dismemberment rather than of secession, this should have little relevance for the law
of succession. In each case, certain changes in the rights and duties of the states
concerned may be necessitated, but only in virtue of the extent of change and its effect
upon the instruments concerned and not by reason of whether or not the state is
deemed to continue. O'Connell's approach in this regard is undoubtedly radical, and
for that reason his tentative phraseology is entirely apposite. His suggestion is
tantamount to a disposal of all questions of 'succession' understood as an 'inheritance'
or 'assumption' of rights and obligations by reference, not to the normal bivalent
division between succession and non-succession but to the integrity of the legal
relations themselves, hi the context of treaties, then, the matter of succession could be
disposed of within the general category of rebus sic stantibus, as a technique to cope
with situations of 'fundamentally changed circumstances'.65
" Ibid, at 5. He argues that 'With the abstraction of the concept of sovereignty, however, a conceptual
chasm was opened between change of sovereignty and change of government in the one Instance a
problem of substitution in the possession of rights and obligations was raised: in the other, continuity of
these rights and obligations was presumed in virtue of continuity in the personality of the possessor.' Ibid,
at 5-6.
u
 O'Connell argues that "The concept of "personality" with Its Hegelian overtones, seems to have misled
the theorists. Modem Jurisprudence has assisted us in recognixing that the word "personality" does not
stand for something, is not descriptive of anything, and cannot be substituted for by a synonym: 11 Is not
In fact, a reflection of some prototype sitting on a cloud somewhere, but merely a shorthand expression
indicating the faculties of legal action.' See O'Connell, 'Independence and Problems of State Succession',
mW. O'Brien (ed.). The New Nations In International law and Diplomacy (1965) 7. at 11.
" D. O'Connell, The Law of State Succession (1956). at 6.
M
 O'Connell, supra note 3. voL I, at v-vL
" This proposition was first developed by R Wheaton.EfementS(^Irtemat/onfliLflw(8thed., 1866).at275.
O'Coonell expresses It thus: The real question is the extent to which a treaty loses its effectiveness in the
rhpngifl rttimtinn If H hf [Hi-mnnrH that hrntVp |n prinripl^ yunrtgf thy rhangf nf gnrniT)n)fT|t a Wider
spectrum of treaties Is likely to be excluded from lapse on frustration than if the contrary be presumed:
and the presumption might very well vary according to whether the case is characterised as one of
annexation, cession, federation, secession or independence. When the contracting State totally
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Whilst O'Connell was entirely right in his assessment of the abstracted artificiality
of the notion of 'sovereignty' or 'the state' in international law and, as we shall see,
was also right in thinking that 'personality' as currently understood is problematic as
a determining criterion for succession, it is doubted whether his advocated return to
the practice of the eighteenth century is either possible or desirable.6* As an Initial
point, it is clear that O'Connell did not found his argument exclusively, or even
mainly, upon state practice. He was very much aware that practice by its nature is
open to a wide variety of constructions. For O'Connell, the point was that such
practice should be rendered coherent by means of the force of 'reason' or 'Juristic
logic'. 'A rational approach', he thought, 'will thrust the emphasis on positive
manifestation of the need for order and stability to be discovered in regular solutions
devised by states in their day-to-day practice'.67 Such an avowed resort to rationalism
clearly exposes the precarious nature of his thesis: only if one treasures legal
continuity at the expense of allowing new states to determine their own legal future
may one follow O'Connell on this point In its barest form, it is far from being a
compelling or overwhelming argument.
Leaving aside the unstable grounding of his thesis, there are a number of other
more practical reasons why O'Connell's approach is to be questioned. First, even if his
argument were to be given due deference, there would still remain questions that
could not be resolved. For example, the issue of personality which underlies the
differentiation between secession and dismemberment (and between absorption and
union) would remain ultimately crucial as regards membership in international
organizations,6* and possibly also as regards the continuance of political treaties69 and
the attribution of delictual responsibility.70
O'Connell avoids the first issue by arguing that membership in international
organizations is a distinct, and particular, issue. To his mind, membership in these
organizations is not strictly a matter of general international law — it is subject to the
disappears as an administrative entity, it Is likely that a wide range of treaties would cease to be
performable In the changed circumstances, and the presumption might be against treaty survival. But
when the change of sovereignty modifies the circumstances of performance only slightly, if at all, the
presumption will be reversed.' O'Connell. supra note 3. vol. I, at 3.
Crawford points out that although O'Connell objected to the traditional classification, he nevertheless
retained that structure In his own work. See Crawford. The Contribution of Professor DJ>. O'Connell to
the Discipline of International Law'. 51 BYbIL (1980) 2.
Ibid,
The case of Germany has been presented as one of absorption, which Itself gives rise to few problems
regarding UN membership. Oeter, supra note 10. at 368. Ct Article 11 of the Unification Treaty.
Political treaties were traditionally thought to be 'personal' rather than 'dispositive'. They were. In other
words, dependent upon the continued existence of the parties concerned. See. O'Connell. supra note 63,
at 15.
Article 39 of the 1978 Convention provides that '[t]he provisions of the present Convention shall not
prejudge any question that may arise In regard to the effects of a succession of States in respect of a treaty
from the international responsibility of a State ...'.
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internal rules of the particular organization and therefore conditional upon the
acceptance of certain constitutional obligations. Even if this argument is accepted,
distinguishing between forms of state practice in this way tends to be rather too easy.
Leaving aside the willingness of a state to comply with the rules of the organization
concerned, it cannot necessarily be assumed that decision-making within organiza-
tions is made by reference to a discrete set of concepts and principles that are not
applicable outside that context.71 It is widely acknowledged, for example, that the
acquisition of UN membership itself may be a central means by which the general
personality of a state is established.72 Hence, it was not without some significance that
Russia took over the mantle of the USSR as regards its seat in the UN and, in
particular, its membership within the UN Security Council.
Secondly, so-called 'political treaties' which regulate the political and economic
status of the state73 have long been regarded as terminating in case of change of
sovereignty. It is reasoned that alliances, treaties of friendship, treaties forming a
political union, and treaties establishing a system of economic Integration are
lndissolubly linked to the political structure of the state concerned and must therefore
be seen to terminate on the extinction of that state. Reliance upon the notion of rebus
sic stantibus In this context is problematic, particularly insofar as the ICJ has stressed
that resort to that principle must be limited to circumstances which 'resulted in a
radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be performed' and that
the 'change must have increased the burden of the obligations to be executed to the
extent of rendering the performance something essentially different from that
originally undertaken'.74 A case in which one sovereign has absorbed another (or
entered into a union with another) will not necessarily 'increase the burden of the
obligations' In the case of a treaty of friendship. Termination In such circumstances
must in reality turn upon a change In the identity of the state concerned. It might well
be argued that the notion of rebus sic stantibus needs to be expanded to account for
such alterations in the form of states, but to do so without using 'Identity' or
'continuity' as a reference point would place great pressure upon what Is Intended to
be a limited principle.
Thirdly, In discarding the notion of personality as a determinant of rules of
'succession', O'Connell Is forced to base his assertion of legal continuity on something
other than state sovereignty. In practice, he subordinates entirely the question of
consent, placing emphasis instead upon the sovereignty of the international legal
order. He asserts in that vein that '[sovereignty connotes nothing more than the
71
 Cf. Article 4 of the 1978 Convention which provides that '[t]he present Convention applies to the effects
of a succession of States in respect of (a) any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an
international organization without prejudice to any other relevant rules of the organization ...'.
72
 In the case of Macedonia, for example, the UK raw its endorsement of FYROWs membership as being an
act of recognition. Statement of Douglas Hogg, House of Commons. Dtb.. voL 223. WA. coL 241.22 April
199 3. See generally. Craven, 'What's in a Name: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Issues
of Statehood'. AusLYearbook Init L (1995).
" See Jennings and Watts, supra note 42. at 212.
74
 Fisheries Jurisdiction case, i q Reports (1973) 3. at 21.
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supreme legal competence within a defined region' and that such a competence 'is
relative only'.75 As the extent and nature of sovereignty is apparently determined
systemically by the international legal order, it may be concluded that 'the imposition
upon the successor State by international law of duties with respect to such territory is
not incompatible with the extension of its sovereign jurisdiction'.76 While it is clear
that approaching the question of succession from the point of view of 'consent' (or
what O'Connell would refer to as 'will') raises more questions than it resolves. It is
doubtful whether discarding it entirely as a matter of concern purely for reasons of
theoretical convenience is necessarily appropriate. One might question, for example,
why consent should continue to be a central consideration in treaty-making or In the
creation of customary International law if it Is so easily discarded in times of change.
Whatever general rules of succession develop, the continued emphasis upon some
form of consent as the basis of obligation in international law means that it is difficult
to dispose of the argument that a new state should not be subject to customary, let
alone conventional, obligations to which it has not voluntarily agreed. This Is
particularly the case with respect to states that have emerged from colonialism or
some other condition of dependency. By contrast, in a case of continuity, there is
always at least prima facie continuity of rights and duties, subject only to changes that
are necessitated by the transfer of territory or by the principle of rebus sic stantibus.77
That the law of state succession does not appear capable of setting aside, or
discarding, all questions of personality is particularly evident from an analysis of the
ILC's work In that regard. The ILC, apparently taking its cue from O'Connell (not
without some Irony it might be noted78) and wishing to avoid the enunciation of a
'theory' of state succession,79 sought to assimilate several of the traditional categories
of practice (that were otherwise distinguishable by reference to the issue of
O'Connell. supra note 3. vol. I, at 26.
told.
In this context It Is necessary to address O'Connell's characterization of succession as a matter of
succession to a factual situation. If this view were to be taken, it would have to be admitted that the
question of personality has little consequence for the attribution of rights and duties; the difference
between a case of secession and one of dismemberment would not be determined by the continuity or
otherwise of the state, but by the extent of change. Certainly. O'ConneU's approach on this question
avoids the problems associated with relying upon legal actions, such as the idea that rights and duties can
be transferred to an entity that has yet to acquire personality, or the idea that successor states are in some
respect 'parties' to treaties which they have neither signed nor ratified. But he cannot fully explain why
the simple fact of transference of territory from the authority of one sovereign state to another should
have any necessary legal consequences except by reference to existing principles of international law.
Facts, In themselves, do not create law and it Is only by Invocation of a relevant prescription that certain
legal consequences are attributed to material events. In essence, his approach represents an extension of
the 'state as fact' theory and suffers from the attendant problems of explaining the necessary
transformation of fact Into law.
O'ConneU was fiercely critical of the ILCs w o r t see O'Connell. 'Reflections', supra note 39.
See. eg . . First Report of Sir Humphrey WaMock, Special Rapporteur. UN Doc A/CN.4/202. YBRC.
1968, vol. n. 87. at 89, para. 10, where It was commented that If a theory of state succession were
adopted 'it would almost certainly be found to be a strait-jacket Into which the actual practice of States. . .
could not be forced without Inadmissible distortions either of the practice or the theory'.
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personality). Thus, in the 19 78 Convention, it avoided making a distinction between a
case of absorption and one of union (Articles 31-33) and, similarly, between a case of
separation and one of dismemberment (Articles 34-35). In so doing, it was forced to
ignore relevant state practice80 and produced several rules that were barely Justifiable.
First as the experience of German unification shows, the Article 31 rule — namely
that treaties of the predecessor state should be maintained but only in relation to its
former territory — appears to deny the realities of absorption, where the objective is
arguably to create and maintain a single constitutional and administrative struc-
ture.81 Secondly, the Article 34 rule, by which the treaties applicable to the entire
territory of the predecessor state continue in force in respect of each and every
successor state, appears hard to justify when no rule of succession applies in cases of
cession of territory.82 It is clear in this case that the point of distinction is primarily one
of personality; in the case of secession a new entity comes into being, but not so in the
case of cession. But if personality is the relevant distinguishing point here, one might
ask why it is not relevant otherwise.
5 Reinvention of the Subject: Personality and the Identity of
States
Even if the elimination of 'personality' or 'identity' from the law of state succession
cannot be supported, there does remain, nevertheless, a need to re-evaluate such
concepts in light of their apparent indeterminacy. Indeed, it is considered that at this
point legal doctrine has been fundamentally misleading. The initial assumption of
most writers has been that the matter of identity is primarily one analogous to that of
statehood or personality. As Kunz remarked, '[t]he problem of identity of states is not
the antithesis of the problem of state succession but of the problem of the extinction of
States'.83 The result is that it is common to find pronouncements to the effect that
international law has no real understanding of when a state ceases to exist.84 The
point being made is not so much that the existence of the state is merely a
presupposition of the law, an argument associated with early voluntarists,85 but
"' Eg.. In relation to Article 31, it ignored the fact that on the admission of Texas to the USA in 1845, the
'moving treaty frontiers' rule was applied (Texas' treaties lapsing with its absorption). It also drew
exclusively upon the cases of the UAR and Tanzania, which, it admitted were peculiar. Commentary,
1974, at 258, para. 24.
" SeeOeter, supra note 10, at 355.
" CommenUoy. Article 14. at 208, para. 2. It is notable that the IQ could have relied upon Article 34 to
decisive effect In both the Genoddt Convention case (supra note 13) and in the Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project
case {supra note 21). but deliberately chose to rely upon other arguments (In the latter case. Article 12 of
the 1978 Convention).
" J. Kunx. The Changing Law of Nations (1964). at 288. Kunx is right that the problem of Identity is not the
antithesis of the problem of succession. However, even In cases of continuity. Issues of succession might
arise.
" Marek. supra note 56, at 7.
" See. eg . . Cavaglieri. supra note 36. at 340.
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rather that the conditions for the extinction of the state are particular, and more
complex.
When examined closely, however, this argument becomes difficult to comprehend.
Assuming that international law does possess certain criteria that condition the
'existence' of the state, or at least its participation in the legal community, then
logically those criteria should also apply as regards its 'legal demise'. Thus, the general
criteria for statehood (which for purposes of argument are taken to be government
territory, population and independence86) should presumably govern not merely the
legal 'creation' of states, but also their 'extinction'. So. where the territory of a state
becomes submerged by the sea, or where the population of a state evacuates en masse
to other territories, or where it falls into a state of extended anarchy, it should be
possible to conclude that the state has ceased to exist.87
What has to be understood, however, is that the traditional criteria for statehood
are both abstract and exclusionary. They are abstract in the sense that they do not
require the possession of a particular territorial locus, the maintenance of a particular
composition of population or, indeed, a particular form of government Thus, it is
commonly accepted that the continuity of the state is not affected by changes in
government (even revolutionary changes)83 nor by the cession of territory.89 The
requirements of statehood are also exclusionary in the sense that they operate as
threshold evaluations primarily intended to exclude from international discourse
those entities that are not for example, fully independent. That they are not operated
so clearly in the context of putative extinction is primarily a result of the fact that
states are not in the habit of withdrawing recognition from entities once established.90
This, in turn, is primarily due to the fact that states are not willing to jeopardize legal
relations with an entity where there is clearly no successor state. Thus, it is not
surprising that states did not withdraw recognition from the state of Somalia during
the period of dlsrule, nor from Albania despite the apparent total absence of
government The fact that there may be a presumption of continuity in such
circumstances, however, does not detract from the point that the essential conditions
for extinction are logically the same as those for the recognition of new states.
See J. Crawford. The Oration of States In International Law (19 79). The Montevideo Convention defines (In
Article 1) the qualifications for statehood as being the possession of '(a) a permanent population: (b) a
defined territory; (c) government and (d) capacity to enter Into relations with other States'. 165UVTS19.
Independence is more difficult insofar as it is a relational concept Loss of independence assumes a certain
Identity of the subject which cannot easily be presumed in the case of corporate entities.
Protocol of London. 19 February 183 l.CFr. Martens. Nouvtau recuell dt trailes et autres actes rcktlfs aux
rapports de droll, voL 10. at 197.
See. e.g« Hall supra note 52. at 22.
See H. Lauterpacht Recognition in International Law (1947). at 349-352.
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Perhaps this point may be best illustrated with respect to the dismemberment of
Yugoslavia. In that case, the disengagement from the federation of Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, left in place the remaining republics of Serbia
and Montenegro.91 The approach of the Badinter Commission,92 and also apparently
the UN,93 was to argue that the SFRY had ceased to exist as a state in virtue of the fact
of dismemberment. But to accept that would be to say that Yugoslavia had ceased to
exist as a state, despite the fact that it continued to possess, in the form of the FRY. all
the material requirements for existence. The truth is that at no stage did the FRY lose,
in its entirety, independence, territory, population or government: it continued to
possess all these attributes, albeit in a reduced form. It is also interesting to note, in
that regard, that no states actually withdrew recognition from Yugoslavia, or
subsequently the FRY, at any stage.
What this suggests is that a distinction needs to be drawn between transformations
that result in the extinction of the state, strictly understood, and those that result
merely in a change in identity. In the case of Yugoslavia, what is at issue is not so
much whether the FRY is a state, but whether it is the same as, or different from, the
SFRY. The point of difference may be described as follows: whereas the concepts of
statehood and personality proceed on the understanding that states have certain
attributes or qualities in common and that they are thereby attributed with, or
inherently enjoy, certain competencies under international law, the concept of
identity, by contrast, is predicated upon a notion of difference. 'Identity' assumes that
individual states, whilst being members of a particular class of social or legal entities,
also possess certain distinguishing features that differentiate one from another.
Identity, therefore, presumes personality but is concerned with what is personal or
exceptional in the nature of the subject. This can never be provided by reference to the
traditional requirements of statehood.
Once the issue of 'personality' (qua competence) is placed to one side it becomes
clear that in many cases the issue is not simply one of determining the existence of the
state, but rather the degree of identity and extent of continuity. What this means is
that emphasis should not be so much upon the existence of 'external' rules of
succession that allow for the 'transference' of rights and duties from one subject to
another, but rather upon determining the extent to which legal continuity should
follow from elements of material (social, cultural or political) identity. Whilst it is
beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the consequences of this Insight in depth, it
may be noted that there are two general consequences of such an approach. First, if
the distinguishing feature in many cases of succession is recognized as being one of
'identity', it avoids, or at least minimizes, the methodological problems raised by the
apparent lack of 'consent' on the part of successor states as well as by the idea that
" See generally. Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia'. 86 A/ft (1992) 569.
" See Opinion No. 1, 31 UM (1992) 1494. at 1495. See generally Craven. The European Community
Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia1 66 BYbIL (1995) 333. at 357-375.
" See Blum, supra note 23.
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agreements are essentially res inter alios acta. In such cases, the 'successor state' (for
want of a better description) may be assimilated in some degree to the 'identity' of the
predecessor and cannot thereby claim the entitlement to be entirely free from
obligations undertaken by the latter. Rights and obligations that in some sense define
the identity of the subject of succession, should presumptively remain untouched by
events. This may result in supplementing the traditional category of 'dispositive'
treaties which continue in all circumstances with a category of humanitarian treaties
that attach to the 'person' of the subject. It may also justify invoking the principle of
self-determination as a reason for denying the imposition of obligations that were
previously assumed by non-democratic (or previously colonial) regimes.
Secondly, recognizing that identity is the central issue in the law of succession
means that a far more gradated approach needs to be taken whilst dealing with
questions of succession. No longer is it simply a case of determining the applicability of
different rules according to a simple bifurcation between continuity and discontinuity,
but rather of justifying changes to legal relations by reference to degrees of changes in
the identity of the subject. There is a return, here, in spirit (but not necessarily in form)
to the nineteenth-century German Historical School, whose conception of customary
law as the will of the people provided the extant justification for the consensual
orientation of International law.94 There is also, ironically enough, a return to the
relativity of O'Connell's conception of succession, in which he recognized that
problems would not be resolved by any simplistic mechanism that either discarded
entirely the need for continuity or denied the need for legal change. The point of
difference, however, arises In the justificatory discourse — it Is not simply a question of
introducing a presumption of succession or of emphasizing the integrity of legal
relations, but of examining the extent to which a community ought to be burdened
with historic obligations having reference to the nature of the obligation in question,
and the circumstances in which it was assumed.
6 Conclusion
It has been one of the objectives of this paper'to develop thinking as to the substance,
methodology and structure of the law of state succession in such a way as to point to
the need for some reorientatlon. It has been pointed out that the validity or influence
of any rule, principle or doctrinal approach in relation to state succession will rarely be
determined by reference to state practice alone. Even without adopting a stringently
consensual approach to legal obligation, established practice will only provide a very
marginal or Insubstantial argument in favour of either legal continuity or disconti-
nuity. Not only is practice sharply divergent, but there are the added problems of
discerning intent and of binding what are understood to be third parties.
The greater Influence In any approach to state succession, it has been argued, is the
theoretical structure adopted. The problem with traditional approaches, as was
94
 See A. Caity. The Decay of International Law? (1986). at 25-42.
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clearly perceived by O'Connell, was the fact that a great deal was left to depend upon
what was essentially a matter of political technique or argument He therefore
advocated, without too much conviction, that the issue of personality should be
entirely discarded from the law of state succession. It has been argued that such an
approach is not entirely without its problems, there being a number of instances in
which the issue of personality apparently remains essential. What is suggested,
however, is that the problem largely lies in the traditional assimilation of the discrete
notions of personality and identity. Once identity is separated as a conceptually
distinct issue, concerned as it is with the substance rather than the form of the state,
much of the unnecessary rigidity in traditional doctrine may be avoided entirely. The
task for the future, therefore, is to map out some of the characteristics and
determinants of state identity in a way that takes into account not merely the formal
properties of statehood, but also the sense of'self, 'singularity', and 'community', that
justifies the attachment of international legal obligations to particular territories and
social groups. Without such a concept of Identity, international law will remain
unable to appreciate properly, apart from in a very abstract or formal way, the sense of
legitimacy that underlies its claim to be the medium by which individual and
cosmopolitan values and interests are pursued on the international plane.
